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Abstract
Gale, Kuhn and Tucker [1] introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging
some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they
gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a probability distribution for a
desirable reduction relies on optimal strategies in the original game. Also, we correct an
improper example given by them to show that the reverse of a theorem does not hold.
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1. Introduction
Reducing the size of a game without affecting its instrinsic properties such as the Nash
equilibria, the value, and the optimal strategies, is desirable from the viewpoint of computa-
tion and modelling players’ bounded rationality. In their seminal paper [1], Gale, Kuhn and
Tucker (GKT) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies
with respect to some probability distribution on them. A reduction is desirable if optimal
strategies of the original game are restorable from those of it. The main results there are
conditions for a desirable reduction in terms of value. However, they did not relate that con-
dition with the probability distribution, which leaves the practicability of their reductions
in question. Also, a 2× 2 game intended to show the reverse of a theorem does not hold is
improper, which leaves their claim unverified.
This note tries to remedy those defects. We show that a probability distribution for a
desirabe reduction relies on optimal strategies of the original game, which gives a negative
answer to the practicability of GKT’s reductions. Also, we show that it is impossible to find
a proper example for their claim in 2 × 2 games, and give a proper one which is a 4 × 4
game. Finally, we discuss some extensions of their results.
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2. Reductions of Zero-Sum Game
2.1. Elementary Reduction
Let G = (S1, S2; u1, u2) be a two-person zero-sum game, with associated mixed strategy
setsM1 andM2.We denote by v(G) the value ofG, i.e., v(G) = maxx1∈M1 minx2∈M2 u1(x1, x2).
x1 ∈M1 is called an optimal strategy for player 1 iff u1(x1, s2) ≥ v(G) for each s2 ∈ S2.
GKT introduced two reductions on pure strategy sets. The first one is elementary re-
duction. Let S ′1 ⊆ S1 with S
′
1 6= ∅., and p1 a probability distribution over S
′
1. We define
Gp1 = (Sp11 , S
p1
2 ; u
p1
1 , u
p1
2 ), where
(i). Sp11 = (S1 − S
′
1) ∪ {α}, where α is a newly introduced strategy, and S
p1
2 = S2.
(ii). For each s ∈ Sp11 × S
p1
2 ,
u
p1
1 (s) =
{
u1(s) if s1 6= α,
Σs′
1
∈S′
1
p1(s
′
1)u1(s
′
1, s2) if s1 = α
, and up12 (s) = −u
p1
1 (s). (1)
We say that Gp1 is obtained from G by an elementary player 1 reduction (ER1 ). The
intended meaning of Gp1 is that we package strategies in S ′1 and introduce a representative
α which is a mechanism that chooses a strategy randomly in S ′1 by p1. The payoff by choosing
α is the expectation on S ′1 by p1. Player 1’s mixed strategies in G
p1 are connected to those
in G by a mapping φ : Mp11 →M1 such that for each x
p1
1 ∈ M
p1
1 ,
(i). for each s1 ∈ S1 − S
′
1, φ(x
p1
1 )(s1) = x
p1
1 (s1);
(ii). for each s1 ∈ S
′
1, φ(x
p1
1 )(s1) = p1(s1)x
p1
1 (α).
φ is injective. It can be seen that for each x2 ∈M2, u
p1
1 (x
p1
1 , x2) = u1(φ(x
p1
1 ), x2).
The purpuse for reduction is to make it easier to find out optimal strategies. Hence
we need to know when optimal strategies are preserved, or when optimal strategies of the
original game are restorable from those of the reduced game. GKT gave a necessary and
sufficient condition for that as follows:
Theorem 2.1 (GKT [1]) (1) v(Gp1) ≤ v(G).
(2) For each optimal strategies xp11 in G
p1, φ(xp11 ) is also an optimal strategy in G if and
only if v(Gp1) = v(G).
Then it is natural to ask: (1) For each S ′1 ⊆ S1, is there any p1 over S
′
1 such that
v(Gp1) = v(G)? (2) What property should such a p1 satisfy? To answer them, we have the
following statement:
Theorem 2.2. Let S ′1 ⊆ S1, and p1 be a probability distribution over S
′
1.
(1) If for each optimal strategy y1 of G, Σs′
1
∈S′
1
y1(s
′
1) > 0, then v(G
p1) = v(G) if and only if
there is some optimal strategy x1 such that p1(s1) =
x1(s1)
Σs′
1
∈S′
1
x1(s′1)
for each s1 ∈ S
′
1.
(2) If for some optimal strategy y1 of G, Σs′
1
∈S′
1
y1(s
′
1) = 0, then v(G
p1) = v(G) for any p1.
1
1The if-part of (1) seems known to GKT. In [1], p.90, they said “[S]uch an elementary reduction is
possible for any decomposition of the matrix A, merely by choosing a P depending on some optimal first
player strategy for A.”However, the only-if part of (1) and (2), which are more important, seems not noticed
by them.
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To show it, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose v(Gp1) = v(G). If for each optimal strategy y1 of G, Σs′
1
∈S′
1
y1(s
′
1) > 0,
then yp11 (α) > 0 for each optimal strategy y
p1
1 in G
p1 .
Proof. Suppose yp11 (α) = 0 for some optimal strategy y
p1
1 in G
p1. Since v(Gp1) = v(G),
it follows from Theorem 2.1 (2) that φ(yp11 ) is an optimal strategy in G, and φ(y
p1
1 )(s1) =
y
p1
1 (α)p1(s1) = 0 for each s1 ∈ S
′
1. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2: (1) (If) Let x1 be an optimal strategy in G. Define x
p1
1 : S
p1
1 →
[0, 1] by:
x
p1
1 (s
p1
1 ) =
{
x1(s
p1
1 ) if s
p1
1 ∈ S1 − S
′
1;
Σs′
1
∈S′
1
x1(s
′
1) if s
p1
1 = α.
(2)
It can be seen that xp11 ∈M
p1
1 and φ(x
p1
1 ) = x1. Hence, for each s
p1
2 ∈ S
p1
2 = S2, u
p1
1 (x
p1
1 , s
p1
2 ) =
u1(x1, s
p1
2 ) ≥ v(G) ≥ v(G
p1). Therefore, xp11 is an optimal strategy for player 1 in G
p1, and
v(Gp1) = v(G).
(Only-if) Suppose that v(Gp1) = v(G). Let xp11 be an optimal strategy in G
p1 and
x1 = φ(x
p1
1 ). Since for each optimal strategy y1 of G, Σs′1∈S′1y1(s
′
1) > 0, it follows from
Lemma 2.1 that xp11 (α) > 0. Since for each s1 ∈ S1,
x1(s1) =
{
x
p1
1 (s1) if s1 ∈ S1 − S
′
1
p1(s1)x
p1
1 (α) if s1 ∈ S
′
1
,
and by Theorem 2.1 (2), x1 is an optimal strategy of G, it can be seen for each s1 ∈ S
′
1,
x1(s1)
Σs′
1
∈S′
1
x1(s′1)
=
p1(s1)x
p1
1
(α)
x
p1
1
(α)
= p1(s1).
(2) Let p1 be a probability distribution on S
′
1, and x1 an optimal strategy of G with
Σs′
1
∈S′
1
x1(s
′
1) = 0. We define x
p1
1 ∈ M
p1
1 by letting x
p1
1 (α) = 0 and x
p1
1 (s1) = x1(s1) for each
s1 ∈ S1 − S
′
1. It follows that x1 = φ(x
p1
1 ) and v(G
p1) = v(G). 
Theorem 2.2 casts some doubt on the usefulness of GKT’s Theorem 2.1 since it suggests
that a desirable reduction needs detailed and complete information of the optimal strategy
in the original game. Since the purpose of reduction is to make it easier to find an optimal
strategy, why bother to reduce it if we have already known all of them? It may be helpful in
the sense that it allows us to eliminate all irrationalizable strategies, i.e., iteratedly eliminate
strictly dominated strategies (cf. Pearce [3]). However, still there are strategies which survive
iterated elimination are assigned 0 in some optimal strategy, and therefore we cannot exhaust
all desirable reductions.
2.2. Reduction
GKT extended ER. Let Si = {Si1, ..., Siℓ1} be a partition of Si (i = 1, 2). For t =
1, ..., ℓ1, let p1t be a probability distribution over S1t, and p1 = (p11, ..., p1ℓ1). Define G
p1 =
(Sp11 , S
p1
2 ; u
p1
1 , u
p1
2 ) by:
(i) Sp1i = {αi1, ..., αiℓi} for i = 1, 2;
(ii) For s = (α1t1 , α2t2), u
p1
1 (s) = mins2∈S2t2 Σs1∈S1t1p1t1(s1)u1(s1, s2), and u
p1
2 (s) = −u
p1
1 (s).
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Gp1 is said to be obtained from G by a player 1 reduction (R1 ). It can be seen that ER1
is a special case of R1, that is, S1 = {S
′
1} ∪ {{s1}}s1∈S1−S′1 and S2 = {{s2}}s2∈S2 . Again,
player 1’s strategies in the two games are connected by a mapping Φ : Mp11 →M1 where for
each xp11 ∈M
p1
1 and s1 ∈ S1t1 ,Φ(x
p1
1 )(s1) = p1t1(s1)x
p1
1 (α1t1).
As a parallel to Theorem 2.1, GKT shown the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3 (GKT [1]). (1) v(Gp1) ≤ v(G).
(2) If v(Gp1) = v(G), then for each optimal xp11 in G
p1 , Φ(xp11 ) is also optimal in G.
The difference from Theorem 2.1 is that in (2), only one direction holds. GKT argued
that the other direction does not hold by the follwoing example.
Example 2.1 (GKT [1]). Let G be the Matching Pennies game, S1 = {{s11}, {s12}},
S2 = {{s21, s22}}, p11 = (1), and p12 = (1). Then we get G
p1 as follows:
G =
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
p1 = ((1), (1))
−−−−−−−−−−→
Gp1 =
[
−1
−1
]
(3)
Optimal strategy xp11 = (
1
2
, 1
2
) of Gp1 maps into optimal strategy x1 = (
1
2
, 1
2
) of G, while
v(Gp1) = −1 < 0 = v(G).
However, this is not a proper example. To show the reverse of Theorem 2.2 (2) does
not hold, we need an game where each optimal strategy for player 1 in Gp1 maps to an
optimal one in G, and v(Gp1) < v(G). However, in the above, the former does not hold.
For example, yp11 = (0, 1) is optimal in G
p1 , but Φ(yp11 ) = (0, 1) is not optimal in G.
Actually, we can show that a proper example cannot be found among 2× 2 games, that
is, for each 2 × 2 game, v(Gp1) = v(G) if and only if each optimal strategy xp11 in G
p1
corresponds to an optimal one in G.2 To find a proper example, we need to go to larger
games. Here we give
Example 2.2. Consider the following game
G =


3 0 −1 −1
0 3 −1 2
−1 −1 3 0
−1 2 0 3

 .
Let Si = {{si1, si2}, {si3, si4}}, i = 1, 2, and p11 = p12 = (
2
3
, 1
3
). It can be seen Gp1 is just the
Matching Pennies game which has only one optimal xp11 = (
1
2
, 1
2
) for player 1. It can be seen
that Φ(xp11 ) = (
1
3
, 1
6
, 1
3
, 1
6
) is optimal in G. However, v(Gp1) = 0 < 0.5 = v(G).3
As a parallel to Theorem 2.2, we have the following statement:
2A 2×2 game has only four ways to “decompose” it since for each Si, there are only two ways to partition
it, i.e, Si = {Si}, Si = {{si1}, {si2}}. Hence this statement can be shown easily by checking each case.
3Rather than searching in larger games, here start from the reduced Matching Pennies game, choose
some p1, and construct a game having a larger value.
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Theorem 2.4. If for each optimal strategies xp11 in G
p1 , Φ(xp11 ) is also optimal in G, then
there exists some optimal strategy x1 in G such that for each S1k ∈ S1,
(1) If Σs′
1k
∈S1kx1(s
′
1k) > 0, then p1k(s1k) =
x1(s1k)
Σs′
1k
∈S
1k
x1(s′1k)
for each s1k ∈ S1k;
(2) If Σs′
1k
∈S1kx1(s
′
1k) = 0, then p1k can be any probability distribution over S1k.
Theorem 2.4 can be proved in a similar way as the only-if part of Theorem 2.2 (1) and
(2). Its reverse does not hold. Consider the Matching Pennies game G and p1 in Example
2.1. It can be seen that p1 is generated from the optimal strategy (
1
2
, 1
2
) of G. However, as
shown above, not every optimal strategy in Gp1 corresponds to an optimal one on in G.
Theorem 2.4 casts deeper doubt on Theorem 2.3 than that by Theorem 2.2 to Theorem
2.1 since it implies that even complete information on optimal strategies in G is not enough;
a desirable R1 requires a selection on optimal strategies and “proper” partitions of S1.
3. Some Remarks
Both reductions can be defined two-sidedly by iteratedly applying the definitions, and re-
sults in this note can be extended there. Also, they can be extended to zero-sum games with
continuum of strategies. For general n-person games, our results hold by replacing restora-
bility of optimal strategies by that of Nash equilibria, which can be seen as an extension of
Mertens’ [2] small world axiom.
It is wondered whether we can replace the minimum value in the definition of E1 by
other ways, e.g., maximum, median, and what is the condition for a desirable reduction.
Furthermore, whether there is some desirable reduction which does not rely on the optimal
strategies of the original game. We are looking forward for future works in those directions.
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